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Synopsis
The distinction between the discrete and the continuous lies at the heart of
mathematics. Discrete mathematics (arithmetic, algebra, combinatorics, graph
theory, cryptography, logic) has a set of concepts, techniques, and application ar-
eas largely distinct from continuous mathematics (traditional geometry, calculus,
most of functional analysis, differential equations, topology). The interaction
between the two — for example in computer models of continuous systems such
as fluid flow — is a central issue in the applicable mathematics of the last hun-
dred years. This article explains the distinction and why it has proved to be one
of the great organizing themes of mathematics.
1. Introduction
Global versus local, discrete versus continuous, simple versus complex, lin-
ear versus nonlinear, deterministic versus stochastic, ordered versus random,
analytic versus numerical, constructive versus nonconstructive — these con-
trasts are among the great organizing themes of mathematics. They are
forks in the road of mathematical technique — the concepts along one fork
are very different from those along the other, even when they give comple-
mentary views on the same phenomena.
1James Franklin is Professor in the School of Mathematics and Statistics, University
of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. He is the author of An Aristotelian Realist
Philosophy of Mathematics [13], Proof in Mathematics: An Introduction, and books on the
history of probability, Australian philosophy, and knowledge in science.
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It is hard to find a clear exposition of any one of those contrasts. (An
account of the global/local distinction is in [14].) Perhaps the most deep-
rooted contrast is that between discrete and continuous. It is so ubiquitous
in mathematics that the lack of a straightforward overview of the whole topic
and explanation of its significance is astonishing.
The basic distinction is clear enough, but hard to define in terms of anything
simpler.
Discrete: “separate; detached from others; individually distinct”;
Continuous: “extending without interruption of substance; having no in-
terstices or breaks; having its parts in immediate connection” (Oxford
English Dictionary).
The integers are discrete, the real line is a continuum. Matter may be con-
tinuous or discrete (atomic) — it cannot be determined a priori and scientific
investigation is needed.
According to the view of mathematics standard up to modern times, math-
ematics is the “science of quantity”. Quantity is a property that physical
things have, and the way to find out about the quantity of something is to
count (if the quantity is discrete) or measure (if it is continuous). Mathemat-
ics thus has two main branches, arithmetic (dealing with the discrete) and
geometry (dealing with the continuous). That view certainly still makes good
sense of elementary mathematics as taught in school, and indeed, of almost
all the mathematics discovered up to the seventeenth century (by which time
the calculus came to seem more the science of the continuous as such) [13,
Chapter 3]. The origins of this bifurcation in mathematics lie, like so much
else, with the Greeks.
2. The incommensurability of the diagonal
The significance of the discrete/continuous distinction, which established it as
one of the great themes of mathematics, became clear with the ancient Greek
discovery of the incommensurability of the diagonal. It is necessary to explain
this discovery in its own terms, as the common modern reinterpretation of
the result as the “irrationality of the square root of 2” obscures its original
meaning.
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In the most obvious continuous cases, like length, one chooses a unit arbitrar-
ily and measures the ratio of all other lengths to the unit. (“By Number”,
Newton says in his magisterial prose, “we understand not so much a Multi-
tude of Unities, as the abstracted Ratio of any Quantity, to another Quantity
of the same kind, which we take for Unity” [27, page 2].) That can give the
impression that continuous quantity is not fundamentally different from dis-
crete: to convert any continuous problem to a discrete one, it is just necessary
to find a small enough unit to measure all the continuous quantities involved.
Given a ruler divided finely enough, it should be possible to find the ratio of
any continuous quantities, say lengths, by counting exactly how many times
the ruler’s unit is needed to measure each quantity. One length might be 127
times the unit and another 41 times, showing that the ratio of the lengths is
127 to 41.
That natural and even compelling thought is incorrect, as the ancient Greeks
discovered. Perhaps the first truly surprising result in mathematics was the
one attributed (traditionally but without much evidence) to Pythagoras, the
proof of the incommensurability of the side and diagonal of a square. There
is no unit, however small, which measures diagonal and side, that is, of which
both are whole number multiples.
The method by which the Pythagoreans discovered this is unknown. (It
certainly did not resemble our modern algebraic proof of the irrationality of√
2.) No method is entirely easy. It was most likely something like this (the
relevant brief ancient texts of Theon of Smyrna and Proclus are given in [10,
pages 58 and 101] and in [39]). Given any two lengths (not yet divided into
units), it is possible to find the largest unit which “measures” them (if there
is one) by a process of anthyphairesis or “reciprocal subtraction”. It is the
same process as the Euclidean algorithm for finding the greatest common
divisor of two numbers, but applied to continuous magnitudes.
Figure 1: First stage in anthyphairesis of two lengths.
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Given two lengths A and B, we see how many times the smaller one (say B)
fits into the larger one A (in the example, 3 times). If it does not fit exactly
a whole number of times, there is a remainder R that is smaller than both A
and B. (If B does fit exactly, then of course B itself is the unit that measures
both A and B.) Any unit that measures both A and B must also measure
R (since R is just A minus a whole number of B’s). So we can repeat the
process with R and B, either finding that R measures B (and hence A as
well), or that there is a smaller remainder R’, which must also be measured
by any unit that measures A and B. And so on. Since we always get smaller
remainders at each step, we work our way down until the last remainder is
the unit that measures all previous remainders and hence also measures A
and B.
Now, what happens if we apply anthyphairesis to those two very naturally
occurring lengths, the side and diagonal of a square? The side fits once into
the diagonal, with a remainder left over, which we can lay off against the
side, and . . .
Figure 2: First stage in anthyphairesis of diagonal and sides of a square.
The first remainder (diagonal minus side) is the length drawn in thick lines. It
appears three times in the diagram. It fits twice into the (original) side, and
when we take the (small) side length out of the (small) diagonal, we are in the
same position as we were originally with the larger square: taking a side out
of a diagonal. Thus the small square, with its diagonal, is a repeat of — the
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same shape as — the large square with its diagonal, so anthyphairesis goes
into a loop and keeps repeating: at each stage, one side-length is taken out of
one diagonal. Therefore the remainders just keep getting smaller and smaller
and the process never ends. There is thus no unit that measures the original
diagonal and side. The diagonal and side of a square are “incommensurable”.
So the ratios of continuous quantities are more varied than the relations of
discrete quantities. The Greeks drew the conclusion, surely rightly, that
geometry, and continuous quantity in general, is in some fundamental sense
richer than arithmetic and not reducible to it via choice of units. While much
about the continuous can be captured through discrete approximations, it
always has secrets in reserve.
Later work showed that the continuum could, in some sense, be reconstructed
in the discrete. But not easily, naturally or neatly. Infinite decimals proved
usable, but they take a lot of symbols and it is awkward that 0.9999. . .
is equal to 1.0000. . . although the symbol strings are completely different.
(For a history of this gradual development, see [26].) Infinitesimals, which
look discrete but are supposed to be tiny enough to merge into the contin-
uous, are very messy [2, 43]. Cantor’s standard discrete “construction” of
the continuum involves equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of rationals
(themselves equivalence classes of pairs of integers), of cardinality an infinity
higher than that of the whole numbers. Even then, the result requires that
some infinite sets of points add up to a finite length and some do not, so
one has to start again to define measure. If that is what it takes to imitate
the continuous in a discrete structure, the Greek insight that the two are
fundamentally distinct is arguably vindicated.
3. Discrete Structures from Continuous
The second major discovery of the Greeks was that the continuous sometimes
naturally gives rise to discrete structures, structures not immediately visible
but which give a deep insight into the original continuous phenomenon.
The ancient classification of mathematics included not only pure geometry
and pure arithmetic, but three “subalternate” or applied mathematical sci-
ences, astronomy and optics (subalternate to geometry) and music (subal-
ternate to arithmetic). The reason music was considered allied to arithmetic
was the discovery, also attributed to Pythagoras, of the connection between
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the harmony of notes and the whole-number ratios of the lengths of the
strings producing them. Although the lengths of strings and the pitch of
notes are both quantities whose nature is to vary continuously, a discrete
pattern emerges from them: for strings of a fixed tension, the easily per-
ceived harmonies of octave, fifth and so on are produced by pairs of strings
whose lengths are in small whole-number ratios. The simplest non-trivial
ratio, 2 : 1, produces the most prominent harmony, the octave. Later science
has explained the mystery and at the same time found one mechanism for
how continuous variation can produce discreteness: pitch is caused by the
frequency of soundwaves, and there is something special about the frequen-
cies of waves in small integer ratios. They interact to produce regular large
peaks that affect the eardrums, which randomly-attuned frequencies do not.
Since then, the interplay between the discrete and the continuous has been at
the heart of some of the most profound advances in science and mathematics.
4. Eigenvalues, resonance, algebraic topology, and quantum me-
chanics
Consider the eigenvectors of a linear map of a vector space to itself. A linear
map is a continuous function, but its eigenvectors (with their eigenvalues)
form a small discrete structure which gives, so to speak, the essence or skele-
ton or “big picture” of the map. If we calculate that the eigenvectors of the
matrix (
13 4
4 7
)
are (
2
1
)
(with eigenvalue 15) and
(−1
2
)
(with eigenvalue 5),
then we know in full what the map “looks like”: it expands the plane 15
times in the direction of the first eigenvector and 5 times in the direction of
the second eigenvector, as in Figure 3 on the next page.
The phenomenon can be literally seen in the motion of coupled oscillators,
as in Figure 4. Equal weights A and B moved freely on a frictionless surface
impelled by three equal springs, the outer two of which are fixed to walls.
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Figure 3: Linear map with eigenvalues 15 and 5 in perpendicular directions.
There are two “normal modes”, eigenfunctions of the motion, which can
easily be seen by choosing the initial conditions carefully. If we pull A left
and B right an equal distance and release them, they move in and out in
equal and opposite harmonic motions. That is the first normal mode. The
second arises if we move both an equal distance in the same direction. On
release, they move back and forth in tandem. These simulations are easily
run in the mental visualization facility. It is harder to imagine what happens
if we release the weights from more complicated initial positions, but the
mathematics shows that general motions are superpositions (that is, linear
combinations) of the two normal modes. (Animations are easily available, see
for example http://lectureonline.cl.msu.edu/~mmp/applist/coupled/
osc2.htm, accessed on June 17, 2017.) They are the eigenfunctions, acting
as a natural basis, or discrete “skeleton”, of the continuous space of all the
possible motions.
Figure 4: Coupled oscillators. Image created by Gerald O. Nolan.
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The most central and deepest interplay between discrete and continuous,
however, lies in algebraic topology. Jean Dieudonne´ predicted that “the 20th
century will come to be known in the history of mathematics as the cen-
tury of topology, and more precisely of what used to be called combinatorial
topology, and which has developed in recent times into algebraic topology
and differential topology” [5, page 7]. The word “topology” refers to the con-
tinuous spaces that are the original objects of study, while “algebraic” refers
to the discrete structures such as homology groups, Betti numbers and the
like which form the deep structure which distinguishes those spaces which
are “really” — topologically — different.
To take a simple illustrative example, the fundamental group of a (path-
connected) space consists of the equivalence classes of loops in the space,
loops being identified if one can be deformed (in the space) into the other.
Thus the fact that the fundamental group of the torus is Z× Z corresponds
to the fact that a loop cross-sectionally across the torus cannot be deformed
to one around the middle, as in Figure 5:
Figure 5: Loops a and b on the torus are not deformable to each other. Image created
by Yonatan-commonswiki, available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Fundamental_group_torus2.png with a CC-SA 3.0 license.
The loops themselves are continuous objects, but their identification under
deformability creates a discrete object, the fundamental group, which char-
acterizes the global topological structure of the space.
The ways in which the Schro¨dinger Equation (a partial differential equation
in continuous space and time) gives rise to discrete entities like electron
orbitals and the collapse of the wave function is of course a major theme of
quantum mechanics. That is what makes it quantum mechanics. The story
is too large to go into here, but parallels the way in which eigenvectors arise
from linear maps.
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5. Dispatches from the long war between the continuous and the
discrete
The problem is that the continuous is easier to imagine and prove results
about, but the discrete is unavoidable when it comes to calculation. Since
Hipparchus and Ptolemy predicted the smooth orbits of the planets by calcu-
lating with up to five places of sexagesimals [36, pages 57-58], it has been an
exceedingly painful process to make the continuous and the discrete match
approximately. Mathematicians sometimes say, especially when advertising
themselves to outsiders, that they are guided by mathematical beauty, and
seek only beautiful mathematics. “Beauty is the first test,” said G.H. Hardy,
“There is no permanent place in this world for ugly mathematics” [19, page
85]. Surely no-one can say that with a straight face after struggling with how
to prevent a fourth-order Runge-Kutta method from degrading the sharpness
of a wave front. Numerical analysis of schemes to approximate ordinary and
partial differential equations is essential mathematics, but excruciating.
The most familiar discrete approximation of the continuous is probably the
definition of the Riemann integral. The integral of a continuous function is
a continuous entity, while the lower and upper sums are discrete entities —
finite sums — whose values approximate it. (See Figure 6 on the next page.)
There are plenty of theorems on the goodness of the approximation, in terms
of the variation of the function and the fineness of the partition. That means
that the way the discrete approximation works is tightly controlled and well
understood.
What is misleading about the Riemann integral as a case study of discrete ap-
proximations to the continuous is simply that integration is more numerically
stable than differentiation. The definition of a derivative involves division by
a difference of nearly equal numbers, leading to any errors in the denomina-
tor blowing up. Nothing like that occurs with numerical integration, where
small errors in the abscissa or ordinate make little difference to the com-
puted integral (unless there is something very strange about the integrand).
That is one source of the problems that are endemic in numerical approx-
imations to differential equations, both ODEs and PDEs. (Other sources
include the chaotic nature of some of the differential equations.) Trade-offs
are inevitable. A finer discretization of space and time is more desirable —
for the same reason as a finer partition to approximate a Riemann integral
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Figure 6: Lower sums approximating the Riemann integral of a continuous function. Image
from http://mathworld.wolfram.com/LowerIntegral.html, accessed on June 17, 2017.
— but at the same time it gives more opportunity for errors to accumulate
across the many computational steps, so that the discretized system loses
track of the continuous reality being modeled.
Figure 7: Adapting the grid for numerical solution of a PDE to the region of integration.
This image is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from
the CFD Wiki article ’Mesh generation’ at CFD Online.
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It is not surprising then that several fronts have opened up in the war be-
tween continuous and discrete perspectives, in areas where the exact relation
is harder to establish. One concerns the value of discrete “agent-based” or
cellular automata models of self-organizing phenomena in economics, ecology,
combat, traffic and so on, versus continuous PDE models. Agent-based mod-
els propose individual agents with a few basic properties, which interact with
nearby agents according to a few update rules. It is often observed that quite
simple rules will generate complex emergent behavior in the mass, and it is
easy to attribute a kind of “swarm intelligence” to the collection of agents.
PDE models, by contrast, appear to admit of only simple local influences and
would be expected to give rise to less complex and more predictable global
behavior.
That natural thought appears to be wrong. The remarkable pictures on pages
165–166 of Wolfram’s A New Kind of Science [42] show that the phenomenon
central to Wolfram’s book, the generation of complex behavior from simple
rules, is found in PDEs as much as in cellular automata.
Figure 8: A partial differential equation imitates the “simple rule, complex behavior” of
cellular automata. Stephen Wolfram, A New Kind of Science, Wolfram Media, Champaign
IL, 2002, 923, Copyright: Stephen Wolfram, LLC, http://www.wolfram.com.
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Similarly in a field like combat modelling, the tendency to anthropomorphize
simple agents which exhibit complex behavior in the mass will be lessened
when we realize that PDE models can do the same. ([20, 6]; in the reverse
direction [34])
Another front concerns the modelling of physical reality, such as fluid flow.
Real fluids are discrete ensembles of molecules undergoing flow that is partly
smooth and deterministic and partly stochastic (when molecules collide).
Computation of fluid flow is also discrete, but one very rarely uses a model
at the molecular level. Usually one makes do with a continuous model of
flow which is hoped to approximate the real situation, then approximates
that with a discretized PDE as above. Both stages of the approximation
involve major mathematical difficulties, the first from the awkwardness of
approximating a stochastic process by a continuous flow [33], and the sec-
ond from (in addition to numerical difficulties) the well-known and obvious
problems of the chaotic nature of turbulent flow.
What should be emphasized is that the success (or not) of these approxima-
tions is not to be explained by philosophical hand-waving about “idealiza-
tions”. It is a provable mathematical fact (or not, as the case may be) that
the continuous model of fluid flow approximates well the real mathematical
structure of bouncing molecules on the one hand, and on the other hand the
system of difference equations used in the computation.
Other fronts in the discrete-continuous war — too extensive to be surveyed
here — include the poor attempt of Artificial Intelligence to ground discrete
symbols in the continuous flow of perception (e.g. to transform continuous
visual input into a list of objects in a scene), and the endemic inability of
discrete logic to cope with arguments involving continuous variation, such as
fuzzy logic and extrapolation arguments [12, 29].
As the radical Left used to say, “The struggle continues.”
6. The discretized continuous versus the truly discrete
The examples of the Riemann integral and numerical simulations of differen-
tial equations raise a complex question, hard to focus on, concerning whether
such fine-grained discretizations of continuous phenomena are “really” dis-
crete mathematics. The question has been discussed in philosophy, following
David Lewis, under the rubric: Is the analog/digital distinction the same as
the continuous/discrete distinction?
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The issue is easily appreciated in the example of a clock. Mechanical clocks
represent time continuously, while a clock with a digital display represents it
discretely. But what about a watch with a normal face which has a second
hand that moves forward each second? It is in one way discrete, as it repre-
sents no intervals smaller than one second. But it is in one sense “analog”,
as in analogous, because it represents time by a quantity (angle) that varies
linearly with time. It, so to speak, pictures time directly [1, 22, 24]. How
finely it does so is irrelevant to the mode in which it represents, and is quite
different from the way a digital display does so. A discrete analog represen-
tation of time thus has much in common with a continuous representation,
and is quite unlike a digital display. So it is arguable that the distinction
analog/digital cuts across the distinction continuous/discrete.
That debate is about representation, and is intended to cast light on how
the mind or brain represents reality: is that fundamentally analog or digital?
But the issues are not confined to that context. A discretized PDE is like the
PDE it approximates — that is the point of it. Discrete analysis, as in the
analysis of finite approximations to a Riemann integral, is obviously close
to real analysis, and discrete but finely divided functions behave in many
ways like continuous functions. (One can pursue discrete analysis by itself,
pretending that its continuum approximation does not exist, but it is not
easy [44]. Smooth functions, like smooth chocolate, are our preference, but
we can cope with the gritty variety if need be.)
Perhaps there is no definite right or wrong answer to the question of whether
the discrete and the digital are really the same. But since the original aim
of this article was to discuss the fork in the road between discrete and con-
tinuous mathematics, it seems fair to note that there is a major difference in
style of thinking between the discretized continuous, as in simulations, and
mathematics that is inherently discrete from the start, like number theory,
combinatorics and cryptography.
7. The signature of the discrete: simple integer ratios in Dalton
and Mendel
We now turn to some more applied fields and ask what evidence is relevant
to deciding whether a reality being studied is discrete or continuous. If
something is continuous as far as perception can tell, it can be very hard to
tell if it is discrete at a smaller scale.
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What is the evidence that atoms exist? The ancient Epicureans and some
seventeenth-century philosophers proposed them as neat explanations of var-
ious phenomena, but they could not point to any convincing cases where an
explanation in terms of atoms was superior to one using the alternative and
more natural hypothesis that matter is continuous. The first convincing ar-
gument for atoms was that of Dalton, who discovered instances of what is
now called the law of multiple proportions — if two elements form more
than one compound between them, then the ratios of the masses of the sec-
ond element which combine with a fixed mass of the first element will be
ratios of small whole numbers. An atomic structure of matter gives a good
explanation while a continuous one has little prospect. Dalton wrote:
The element of oxygen may combine with a certain portion of
nitrous gas, or with twice that portion, but with no intermediate
quantity. In the former case nitric acid is the result; in the latter
nitrous acid . . . Nitrous oxide is composed of two particles of
azote and one of oxygen. This was one of my earliest atoms. I
determined it in 1803, after long and patient consideration and
reasoning. [4, 35]
Another easily appreciated example is Mendel’s work on genetics. One of the
many problems with Darwin’s original theory of evolution concerned “blend-
ing inheritance”. Natural selection, according to Darwin, acts on small mu-
tations that occur rarely and at random in populations. But since the pos-
sessor of such a mutation has to breed with the “normals” of the population,
surely a favorable mutation should blend back into the population over a few
generations before natural selection has a chance to act? Like many other
problems with evolutionary theory, it was only admitted to be serious once
it had been solved. The solution came with Gregor Mendel’s discovery that
the genetic material was, often at least, discrete. And the discovery of dis-
creteness, through Mendel’s experiments with peas in his monastery garden,
came, as it had with the Pythagoreans and Dalton, with the noticing of small
whole-number ratios in material that was in its nature continuous.
Mendel took two lines of peas, short and long, each bred over several gener-
ations to be “pure” or “true”. That is, the short ones produced only short
ones and the tall ones only tall ones. Then he crossed them, that is, polli-
nated the flowers of the short ones with pollen from the tall ones. With a
genius for “population thinking” exceedingly rare in his age, he thought to
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perform this experiment many times and count the results. He found, not
very excitingly, that all of the crosses were tall (not somewhere between short
and tall, but clearly tall). But if this generation of tall ones were crossed with
one another, the results were not all tall but consistently about 3/4 tall and
1/4 short. The simple phrase “consistently about 3/4. . . ” is deceptive. It
makes something hard to find look easy. The discreteness of the ratio 3 : 1
does not reveal itself in any single experiment, especially a small one with
one or two plants. One must take a count in a large number of experiments,
and be content that the ratio is not exactly 3 : 1.
Mendel correctly posited a theory of discrete factors or genes that would
explain the simple ratio. He supposed that length of peas depends on each
individual’s having two genes for height, each either “tall” or “short”, with
the combination “tall” and “short” resulting in the same appearance as two
“talls”, and with random assortment of genes between generations. When
first generation plants (all appearing tall but in fact all having one “tall”
and one “short” gene) are crossed with one another, the next generation has
about one quarter “tall-tall”, half “tall-short” and a quarter “short-short”;
only the last quarter appear short.
With one bound, Darwin’s theory was free of the blending inheritance prob-
lem. Assortment of discrete genetic material is capable of giving a mutation
several chances to express itself fully.
There have been widespread doubts as to whether Mendel’s published results
were too close to the 3 : 1 ratio to be convincing. R. A. Fisher loudly accused
him of fraud. As his personal papers do not survive, it is hard to know for
sure. The results he claimed for the tall-short experiment were 1787 tall to
227 short, or 2.84 : 1. That is not very close to 3 : 1, and indeed would only
be recognized as a 3 : 1 ratio in the context of several other similar results.
When looking for the discrete in the continuous, one needs to know what one
is looking for.
Defenses of Mendel have appeared, but to little effect [7, 28]. “Hero’s feet
found not of clay after all” — what kind of a headline is that?
8. Space and time: discrete or continuous?
Is space, on the small scale, continuous or discrete? That is not known at
present, nor it is known whether it could be known in principle.
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We have become used to thinking that matter is discrete but space and time
are continuous. That is inherently rather unlikely — why the difference?
The ancients took it for granted that either matter, space and time were
all continuous (as Aristotle thought) or all of them were discrete (as the
Epicureans thought) [41]. Euclid’s geometry incorporates the assumption of
the continuity of space (for example, in two concentric circles, all the radii
of the larger circle intersect the smaller circle in distinct points — it cannot
happen that there are insufficient points in the inner circle to keep the inner
intersections distinct). As Euclidean geometry was thought to be necessarily
true of real physical space, that put the immense authority of mathematics
behind the assumption that space is continuous. Pascal, for example, in his
correspondence with Fermat ([30], discussed in [11, page 305]) which founded
the mathematical theory of probability in response to an alleged paradox from
the Chevalier de Me´re´, wrote that de Me´re´’s incompetence in mathematics
was obvious from the fact that he thought an interval of space had only a
finite number of points.
But de Me´re´ was right, at least to the extent that the continuity of space can-
not be proved. The small-scale shape of space, just as much as its curvature
or its large-scale topology, is an empirical matter, to be decided on the basis
of experimental results [9]. The possibilities for the microstructure of space
are quite diverse: not just R3 and Z3, but various discrete lattices regular and
irregular, non-locally-simply-connected spaces that are so to speak foamy all
the way down, and homogeneous but imprecise spaces where, below a certain
scale, there is no fact of the matter as to where anything is.
The verdict of modern physics on the question is so far ambiguous. If space
is discrete — at the Planck length or below, around the scale of 10−35m — it
has left no clear signature on the observable world. It might have, since some
microstructures of space, no matter how small, can make a difference at the
macroscopic level. For example, if space at the small scale consists of atoms
arrange in a cubic lattice, then the axial directions are distinguished, and if,
as one would naturally suppose, the distance from A to B is the number of
the shortest path through adjacent atoms, then the diagonal of a 1×1 square
with sides in the axial directions has length 2, not
√
2, see Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Length of shortest diagonal path in Z2.
It would seem to follow that motion in some directions should be observably
much slower than in others. However, no such macroscopic anisotropy is
observed in real space [40, page 43].
The standard modern physical theories, relativity and quantum mechanics,
are expressed in terms of continuous space and time but there are no observa-
tions — perhaps no possible observations — to confirm directly that that is
so. Erwin Schro¨dinger, like many physicists dealing with the very small, was
impressed with how elaborate the structure of the mathematical continuum
is and how little observational support there is for supposing it is instantiated
in its entirety in real space. The observations on which quantum mechanics
are based are discrete, and Schro¨dinger wrote that the “facts of observation
are irreconcilable with a continuous description in space and time” [31, page
40]. Richard Feynman said:
It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we understand
them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of
logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how
tiny a region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time.
How can all that be going on in that tiny space? Why should it
take an infinite amount of logic to figure out what one tiny piece
of space/time is going to do? [8, page 57]
372 Discrete and Continuous
However orthodoxy in quantum mechanics has taken discreteness to be a
fact about observation, and has founded the theory on the (unobservable)
wave function, which gives the description of a system as a function of the
usual continuous space and time. Discreteness then reenters in the “collapse
of the wave function”, which produces discrete observations but does not
cast doubt on the continuity of space or time [17, Chapter 1]. Some less
standard later physical theories have raised many proposals for deriving our
apparently continuous space and time from something more basic, possibly
discrete, but no such theories have become firmly established; nor on the
other hand has that approach been ruled out (e.g. [25, section 4]; [32, 38];
the search in quantum gravity in [18])
In those circumstances, it is possible to suggest that the universe is digital
in its entirety and to offer a discrete mathematics to do all of physics, as
sketched in Wolfram’s A New Kind of Science [42, Chapter 9]. But that is
as much pure speculation as Epicurus’s atomism was. At the moment, it is
simply unknown whether space and time really are continuous.
9. Should we abolish the continuous?
If the continuous were abolished, how much serious mathematics would be
left? Would we cope?
We know the answer to that question, because we have been teaching math-
ematics to computers for decades. When computers came to do mathemat-
ics, the continuous was abolished, since digital computers are finite objects.
They deal in whole numbers with a fixed maximum size. Instead of real
numbers, they are restricted to “floating point numbers” of limited preci-
sion, whose mathematics is awkward but in quite a different way from the
continuum [15, 37]. Computer graphics packages do geometry on a large
but finite grid of points. Symbolic manipulation packages such as Mathe-
matica, Matlab and Maple manipulate finite formulas and solve differential
equations, draw graphs and can pass mathematics exams more reliably than
most mathematics students. The search for theorem-proving and especially
theorem-discovering software has been much less successful, but there are
some worthwhile advances [3, 23]. The end result is that finite machines
with finite resources can output a product that reads to humans like mathe-
matics, in greater quantity and quality than any individual human.
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The success of computers in doing mathematics (or imitating it, if one insists
that mathematics must be a product of a mental process) depends on two
facts. The first is that so much of the mathematics we need to do is finite.
The second is a purely mathematical fact about the abilities of discrete and
continuous mathematical structures to imitate one another.
First, much of what we really need to do in mathematics is finite and requires
no reference even remotely to infinity. The truth that 2 × 3 = 3 × 2 is
purely finite. It stands on its own irrespective of any generalizations of
which it may be an instance. One could choose to derive it from Peano’s
axioms of arithmetic, which do refer to the infinite system of numbers, but
that does not make the truth itself have any reference to infinity — the
derivability is just a consequence of the obvious fact that a finite structure
can be embedded in an infinite one. All the (finitely many) arithmetical facts
that can be output by a standard electronic calculator are finite, and such
facts are generally sufficient for applications of mathematics in the fields that
are its bread-and-butter, accounting and data analysis. Since J.G. Kemeny’s
classic 1957 textbook on finite mathematics [21], there have been very many
books and courses on “finite” and “discrete” mathematics, including topics
such as logic, combinatorics, matrices and networks with their applications
and alleged applications to business and the social sciences.
Even beyond that, it is not clear that the standard mathematics of the con-
tinuum is needed for work in applied mathematics. While humans most
naturally think of space, time, mass and other such quantities as continuous,
perceptions and measurements have finite precision, so it could reasonably
be hoped that any practical mathematical tasks in physics and engineering
could be accomplished with finite-precision arithmetic. But it is not obvi-
ous whether that hope is realistic: although direct measurement might well
need only numbers as precise as the limits of the measuring device, it is not
clear whether, for example, computing the advance of a wave might prove
impossible if space and time in the computation are restricted to a discrete
approximation.
The development of digital computers spurred the effort to see whether con-
tinuous processes could be calculated via discrete approximations. Indeed,
that is what computers were invented for. Long before word-processing,
spreadsheets and databases were thought of, computers were built to com-
pute ballistic tables and simulate the weather, that is, to compute discrete
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approximations to continuous dynamics [16, part II]. The verdict was as de-
scribed above: discrete simulations work well across the board, but they
are very painful to program and there are many pitfalls in making sure the
discretized version correctly tracks the continuous process it is simulating.
Chaos theory and the theorems of numerical analysis show there are fun-
damental limitations in certain cases on how far ahead in time the discrete
simulation and the continuous process will stay close. Nevertheless, in prin-
ciple computation with finite objects can imitate a continuous process to any
required degree of precision.
We could just about get by if we abolished the continuous. But it would be
unwise, as the continuous limit of the discrete is the right way to understand
the discrete itself.
To the beginner in mathematics, arithmetic and geometry look very different,
as do algebra and calculus. But at higher levels, the interplay of the con-
tinuous and the discrete has been a driving force in the creation of modern
mathematics. That is true of applied mathematics, with its efforts to approx-
imate continuous processes by computable and hence discrete systems. It is
equally true of pure mathematics, where naturally discrete structures arising
out of continuous ones, as in algebraic topology, determine which continuous
objects are truly the same, and lead to many of the deepest theorems in all
of mathematics.
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